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Corporate Law’s Distributive Design 
Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise1 makes two novel claims: that 
corporate law places protection of minority shareholders at the heart of its 
endeavor; and that this minority-mindfulness should have even greater 
purchase in constitutional contexts. My retelling of the corporate law narrative 
coupled with my extension of that story to the constitutional domain puts 
pressure on scholars either to dispute my characterization of corporate law (or 
for that matter, constitutional law) or to deny the relevance of that 
characterization to the constitutional sphere. Alternatively and, I think, more 
promisingly, it allows scholars to seek to understand or resolve law’s 
inconsistent attitudes towards minorities in different domains. 
I am glad to have the wisdom of Steven Bainbridge, Richard Delgado, and 
Kevin Johnson in thinking through my boundary-transgressing endeavor. 
Dean Johnson extends my thesis, arguing that immigrants, too, present the 
kind of vulnerable minorities who might deserve legal solicitude, but observing 
that the courts, through the plenary power doctrine, have disabled themselves 
from providing such protection. Delgado meanwhile presses for an explanation 
for the puzzle I identify: why does constitutional law neglect minorities while 
corporate law embraces them? He locates the divide in majoritarian self-
interest. 
Bainbridge, on the other hand, challenges my characterization of corporate 
law as being minority focused. Because his paper, unlike the others, disagrees 
with fundamental aspects of my argument, I will focus this reply to his claims, 
reserving the others for consideration in future work. Part I rebuts Bainbridge’s 
case analysis, demonstrating that the cases show clear judicial succor for 
minority (by which I mean non-controlling) shareholders. Part II turns to 
broader theoretical differences. 
 
1.  Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 (2003). 




Bainbridge identifies cases that he believes show that corporate law 
tolerates discrimination among shareholders (Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co.,2 Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc.,3 and Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.4); allows 
“selfish ownership” (Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.5); has attenuated 
concern for fairness in public corporations (Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien6); and 
permits non-sharing of control premia (e.g., Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care 
Corp.7). In this part, I review these cases to show that they in fact support my 
thesis. 
Take Moran, in which the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a poison pill 
against a minority shareholder attack. Bainbridge argues that the court’s rebuff 
to Moran shows its willingness to tolerate discrimination against minority 
shareholders. But Household’s board instituted the poison pill after it learned 
that Moran, chairman of Household’s largest shareholder, had considered 
leading a leveraged buy-out of Household. The court upheld the defensive 
measure as a means to stave off “coercive two tier tender offers”8 that might 
exploit the other shareholders.9 
When Unocal instituted a defense that excluded hostile acquirer and 
minority shareholder Mesa from a self-tender by Unocal, Mesa complained 
that the board was discriminating amongst different classes of shareholders. 
The court upheld the discrimination as a reasonable mechanism to prevent a 
two tier tender offer, in which the second tier would consist in junk bonds, 
“stamped[ing] shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is 
inadequate.”10 Indeed, the court cited studies showing that shareholders often 
benefited from the defeat of hostile takeovers.11 
To the extent that Moran and Unocal demonstrate a court’s willing to 
tolerate discrimination against a class of shareholders, it is simply a willingness 
of the court to deal skeptically with potentially controlling shareholders whom 
 
2.  493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
3.  500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
4.  162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). 
5.  353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
6.  280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).  
7.  638 F.2d 357, 375 (2d Cir. 1980). 
8.  Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985). 
9.  Id.  
10.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985). 
11.  Id. at 956 n.11. 
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the board, acting with independence and with due care, believes are hostile to 
the interests of the firm’s other shareholders. 
In Zahn, the court held that the corporation’s directors—“puppet[s]” to 
Transamerica’s “puppeteer”12—had failed in their duty to “represent[] all the 
stockholders.”13 
Corporate law does not offer succor to every shareholder who owns less 
than fifty percent of the corporation, especially when the minority shareholder 
seeking the court’s protection intends to become the controlling shareholder 
through a hostile takeover (or receive greenmail to stop trying). Courts 
understand which shareholders truly need legal protection.14 Given rational 
apathy, in a diffusely held corporation, a single large minority owner may 
wield disproportionate influence in the company. Corporate law is not color-
blind; relations of domination and subordination matter; the identity of the 
parties is legally relevant. 
Bainbridge argues that Wilkes affirms the possibility of “selfish ownership” 
by majority shareholders. He makes two crucial omissions in this reference: (1) 
the rest of the sentence; and (2) the rest of the decision. The court required 
that any “selfish ownership” of majority shareholders must be “balanced 
against their fiduciary obligation to the minority.”15 The court sided with 
minority Wilkes, holding that the majority could have followed “an alternative 
course of action less harmful to the minority’s interest.”16 Even though the 
bylaws allowed the directors to set the salaries, the court held that Wilkes had 
been unjustly removed from the payroll. 
Bainbridge for his part says that I neglected to mention parts of the holding 
in Sinclair Oil in which the court upholds the majority shareholder’s actions. 
Indeed, Sinclair prevailed against the minority’s claim of excessive dividends 
and missed business opportunities because the minority could not show any 
harm to the company (and thus its minority shareholders) arising out of the 
dividends or the firm’s expansion policy. In dismissing this part of the 
minority’s claim, the court observed that the minority received its 
“proportionate” share of the dividend.17 No harm, no foul. This victory for the 
controlling shareholder does not undermine my argument. My claim is not 
that the minority shareholder always wins, and on all counts. Being a minority 
shareholder is not some sort of talisman that guarantees success at the bar. 
 
12.  Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 46 (3d Cir. 1947). 
13.  Id. at 45. 
14.  Chander, supra note 1, at 175-77. 
15.  Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
16.  Id. 
17.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971). 
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Bainbridge highlights the sale of control cases, which generally permit the 
controlling shareholder to retain a premium upon the sale.18 While Berle and 
others argued in favor of a sharing rule,19 the law generally permits “owners of 
controlling blocs [to] sell at a substantial premium, without any obligation to 
share the bounty with other shareholders.”20 But this does not disprove my 
thesis. Corporate law permits controlling shareholders to earn premia because 
such a position generally makes minority shareholders better off. An active 
market for corporate control—fostered by control premia—is one of the 
principal means of disciplining management. Bainbridge himself writes in his 
impressive treatise that a “no sharing rule should facilitate replacement of 
inefficient incumbents.”21 Some find “strong empirical support for the view 
that the value of the noncontrolling shareholders’ shares increases following a 
transfer of control.”22 If a sharing rule dampened the disciplinary force of the 
market for corporate control, minority shareholders might be worse off in the 
long run. Yet another feature of the case law protects minority shareholders 
during changes of control: if a minority shareholder complains, judges 
carefully scrutinize the transaction for evidence of looting or usurpation of 
corporate opportunities. 
theory 
To locate occasional cases that fail to protect minority shareholders is not to 
defeat my thesis. After all, no theory can satisfactorily explain all cases, and 
there will be differing views as to whether a loss for minority shareholders in 
one case may hold long-term benefit for minority shareholders overall. Judges 
might also get a particular decision ‘wrong.’ My point is that the overarching 
explanation for judicial action in corporate law matters can generally be found 
in the simple goal of protecting minority shareholders. Corporate law is not 
minority-status blind. 
Consider the universe of persons who are the principal subjects of 
corporate law: directors, officers, controlling shareholders, and minority 
 
18.  One of Bainbridge’s citations for the general rule is inapposite: the sale of stock at issue in 
Treadway “did not transfer control.” Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 
377 (2d Cir. 1980). 
19.  JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 12.01 n.2 (2d ed. 
Supp. 2002) (collecting law review articles on the subject). 
20.  FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
109 (1996). 
21.  STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 349 (2002). 
22.  COX & HAZEN, supra note 19, at  § 12.01 . 
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shareholders. Corporate law imposes fiduciary duties on all of these persons 
with the exception of minority shareholders (unless they are also controlling 
shareholders). Bainbridge’s colleagues have recently argued for the imposition 
of fiduciary duties on activist, minority shareholders, highlighting this 
lacuna.23 Minorities suggests that this lacuna is not accidental—but that the 
duties themselves can be understood as flowing towards minority 
shareholders. 
Bainbridge denies the existence of “significant extra-contractual protections 
for minorities.”24 But how then does Bainbridge explain fiduciary duties, 
which, along with limited liability, form the core of corporate law? What are 
these other than extra-contractual duties placed on directors, officers, and 
controlling shareholders? There might be some out there who would eliminate 
fiduciary duties entirely, collapsing corporate law into limited liability and, 
maybe, securities regulation, but that is not our law today. To argue 
alternatively that fiduciary duties represent merely the contract that one would 
have found were it not for market failures and to conclude from this that 
fiduciary duties are thus not “extra-contractual” is simply to rewrite the 
meaning of “contract”—and seems especially hard to justify in the setting of 
closed corporations with few principals. 
Bainbridge also contests my analogy, saying that the constitutional domain 
should properly be squared with the public corporation domain, not with the 
law of closed corporations, thus declaring closed corporation cases to be 
inapposite to my argument. He argues that closed corporations often involve 
consensus-based decisionmaking, rather than the authority-based 
decisionmaking prevalent in public corporations. But it is the lack of ready exit 
that motivates the heightened fairness concerns and judicial policing in closed 
corporation settings, not the supposed consensus-nature of the 
decisionmaking. “No exit” is true of the constitutional domain as well, and 
thus, I argue, should lead us to be similarly concerned with domination and 
fairness in constitutional quarters. 
Bainbridge’s critique leads me to revisit a carelessly worded footnote 
defining affirmative action.25 I do not believe that corporate law seeks to 
distribute disproportionately large gains to the minority; corporate law may 
devote its own resources disproportionately towards minority protection, but it 
 
23.  Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 
(2008). 
24.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, There Is No Affirmative Action for Minorities, Shareholder and 
Otherwise, in Corporate Law, 118 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 71 (2008), 
http://thepocketpart.org/2008/10/28/bainbridge.html. 
25.  Chander, supra note 1, at 120 n.3.  
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certainly does not require that minorities get a disproportionate share of the 
corporate spoils. 
conclusion 
My back and forth with Bainbridge suggests that there is room to wonder 
what corporate law is all about. It is best not to adopt uncritically any given 
orthodoxy, even when it is as appealing as the simple maximand of shareholder 
wealth. My thesis in Minorities might go further—that shareholder wealth 
maximization is wrong as a descriptive matter; the telos of corporate law is 
shareholder wealth distribution. The business judgment rule immunizes so 
much foolishness26 that it is hard to assert that courts play an active role in 
promoting wealth maximization. Rather it might be more reasonable to assert 
that judges simply police the distribution of the corporate gains (and make 
sure that management is not grossly negligent). 
Corporations have proven to be remarkably successful forms of enterprise 
because of or despite a legal framework attentive to the most vulnerable among 
those contributing capital. Ultimately, through Minorities, I hope to spur the 
thought that human organizational forms stand to learn much from each other. 
 
Anupam Chander is a Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago Law School 
and a Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis. 
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26.  See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
